

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
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2003

May 7, 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Trip to Washington, D.C. on May 4 - 5

1. During the two days I attended two long meetings, one each day in Frank Wisner's office. In addition to Wisner and myself, there were present for all or part of the meeting the first day, Messrs. Bissell, Helms, Roosevelt, [redacted] J. Esterline and Ray Leddy; the second day, Messrs. Bissell, Helms, Roosevelt, [redacted] J

2. At these meetings I delivered with very brief explanations (a) a paper with attachments and a chart plus explanatory material covering the CALLIGERIS internal organization; (b) a paper with chart covering the CALLIGERIS internal intelligence organization; (c) a document prepared by Major Robertson on paramilitary planning.

3. I reported briefly on the following subjects:

a. What had been done on the suggestions set forth in a memo written by Mr. Wisner giving deception ideas. I pointed out the instructions which ONTRICH was given plus mentioning the possible use of [redacted] the use of [redacted] trip to B.A. as a possible ground for implicating Peron and the use of letters from either CALLIGERIS or [redacted] as a basis for making it appear that help is being sought from a group in Texas. It was felt that [redacted] might be useful if his activities were limited to Texas. NUTTING will work on this on his trip. As far as [redacted] was concerned, it was felt that it might be unfortunate to have his activities in connection with SUMMIT mixed up with raising funds for CALLIGERIS since this might tend to make SUMMIT look like a controlled operation. Perhaps at a later date, [redacted] visit might be usefully interpreted as an effort to raise Argentine funds for CALLIGERIS. As far as the CALLIGERIS - [redacted] letters are concerned, Wisner was anxious to have something done and steps are being taken by LINCOLN.

b. The ERRATIC letter to the embassies in Salvador pointing out that the enclosure which purported to be information on the CALLIGERIS effort of 1953 was still fairly good for deception purposes.

c. The return of [redacted] J to the fold including a statement of the recent visit to [redacted] J by MYLKES and ONTRICH and of the functions which [redacted] J plans to perform when he returns.

d. PAGE'S activities:

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d. PAGE'S activities: (1) with respect to [] (2) with respect to a labor man to help him. As to (1) a report from SOCCER on his return was mentioned but detailed discussion was withheld pending receipt of the SOCCER report in writing plus PAGE'S dispatches. As to (2), Headquarters was told that it was too late to pursue the CIO man any further and LINCOLN would do the best it could through personnel already in the field and through any openings which NUTTING may find on his trip to Mexico.

e. The 32 campaign and the opening of SHERWOOD. Fortunately as to the latter, the report in the New York Times was available for the second day.

f. WASHTUB - no comment necessary.

g. The results of [] trip to El Salvador.

4. I covered the following administrative problems either in the meetings or through personal conversation with appropriate Headquarters personnel:

a. The need for another girl and radio operator in Guatemala City. I was told that both were ready to go but were being held up by State Department processing with the best estimate of arrival being May 15. There is no doubt that Headquarters has expended a lot of time in trying to break the log jam but I finally asked Wisner if he would personally try to do something, at least about the radio operator. He said he would and I was advised by [] on the telephone on May 6 that the radio operator is scheduled to leave Washington on May 12. The girl should follow in 2 or 3 days.

b. The question of not sending info copies of cables was explained and no objection was raised. Headquarters stated that in certain emergency cases they felt that an info to another station was useful in order to permit it as much time as possible to consider a problem before receiving the action. I conceded that no rule is without exceptions but stated that I hope the emergency cases would be few to which Headquarters agreed.

c. The need for a second recorder at SHERWOOD was discussed and I was advised that Headquarters was taking action.

5. Security questions were discussed mainly with [] and [] I was told that info copies of cables marked SECUR had been regularly coming to the Security Division since early in February; that two of the four individuals for the Phillips program could be brought in

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immediately and that the problem on the other two, i.e., POCs instead of CSCs was due to lack of information at Headquarters and that a replacement for [C] [I] could probably be sent without too much trouble although this was a new request and it would have to be considered in the light of all the facts. I suggested to [C] [I] that he talk to [C] [I] on the telephone about these points which he said he would do.

6. The amendment of PIVALL'S contract to substitute per diem for a quarters allowance was fully accepted and I assume that there will be no difficulty.

7. The following points with respect to the State Department were discussed:

a. The need for State to be working on such matters as recognition of a new government, conditions which might be attached to such recognition, economic aid and conditions attached thereto and generally what sort of political setup State would like to see. These points were picked up pretty hard by Wisner and tossed to Ray Leddy who confessed that State to date has not even discussed these questions. The same points were also mentioned with Mr. Dulles at a meeting just before I left where it was agreed that probably the best thing to do would be to list those issues on which State consideration is needed and submit them to State for action. Both LINCOLN and Headquarters should do some work on this and I would suggest that [C] [I] might think about the problem in order to discuss it with NUTTING on his return.

[C] [I] might also be asked for ideas obviously not in terms of submission to State but merely in terms of what international political problems will need to be resolved, if, as and when the new government takes over.

b. The question of whether or not the military mission in Guatemala should be withdrawn. I did not feel like pushing this too hard, particularly as the reason for not requesting withdrawal at the present time was largely based on Ambassador Peurifoy's desire to keep the mission. Peurifoy has agreed however to watch the situation and to request withdrawal if at any time he thinks the effect will be good. Defense, I believe, would like to pull the mission out but may be persuaded by State not to do so.

c. The SS WULFSBROOK was discussed at great length and since however there is already cable traffic on this, I will merely say that State sent a cable to HICOG to ask the West German Government either to recall the ship or to authorize the United States to take it into some United States port for

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inspection. The British have been warned in case the ship puts into Kingston or Belize, the [] has been asked to take whatever action it can at Puerto Barrios and LINCOLN has been asked to take any possible action against movement of the shipment across Guatemala in case they are successfully landed.

8. Other things done:

a. I called [] and explained to him the reasons I had felt it was better for the present to call off [] trip.

b. I talked to [] AMD, who stated that with the availability of the 3rd Aircraft plus crew chief, it would be possible if necessary to fly all three aircraft at the same time since the new crew chief is also a co-pilot and can therefore complete a two man crew with the transfer of one of the pilots from one of the other crews. He also stated that he knew of two other pilots that could be signed out if needed who, I understand, were former commercial air line pilots but presently out of a job.

c. I discussed PP material with [] who completed the arrangements with [] on the telephone.

d. I asked [] who has been dealing with [] to look into both the question of special intelligence and PT/16. I unfortunately had very little time to discuss this with him and it was just before I had to leave for the plane. I told him however that [] and [] should be able to give him the background. Despite the rush I think that he understood what I was driving at.

e. I spent about an hour with Ambassador Willauer who discussed certain subjects which he had previously mentioned particularly bringing his plane to Honduras. I think that I persuaded him that this was a matter on which we couldn't help. At any rate, Frank Wisner proposes to do so if I didn't. Willauer mentioned worry about the present labor situation in Honduras and referred to information which he had received regarding the seizure of a Guatemalan plane when it landed in Honduras at the end of a black flight. Cables have been sent asking for further information on this subject.

f. Finally, the topic which perhaps took the most time of all was the use of overflights in connection with PBSUCCESS. Without going into details, the following in my opinion represent the tentative conclusions reached:

(1) Any use of American pilots will be very difficult to sell. Particularly is this true as to our present CAT

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crews but it is also, to a great extent, true of any American crew. The main basis for this objection seems to be the feeling that there is no cover story for American crews which will stand inquiry. A possible but still doubtful exception might be granted for night leaflet drops.

(2) Any use of CIA procured aircraft will be difficult to sell. Again it is mainly a question of inadequacy of cover story but it was also mixed up with general objections to overflights and to air drops both of which Headquarters feels are sufficiently unusual in Latin American revolutions to result in United States implication. In this connection it might be said that the very arguments for the use of the planes and crews, namely their greater efficiency, also point to the United States since they confirm that equal operational efficiency is not to be found in Latin America.

(3) Use of foreign crews and foreign aircraft can probably get approval. Arguments above however against use of any aircraft will still be used. If deliveries of materiel can be made by landings rather than parachute drops, this might facilitate approval.

(4) Use of free lance pilots and aircraft located, e.g., at Honduras would probably be unobjectionable though it is hard to know what sort of useful mission they could perform. They might be of some use to create confusion.

We should, by next Tuesday, present to Headquarters some pretty definitive plan showing the minimum number of flights both leaflet and supply which will be needed (recognizing that resupplies are contingent and therefore no specific number can be estimated), the planes and crews which it is proposed to use together with applicable cover stories.

9. In this connection, we should try, by next Tuesday, to give Headquarters our best thinking on the following:

- a. Planned movement of materiel.
- b. Planned movement of personnel.
- c. Plans for Santa Fe.
- d. PT/16 plans.
- e. Communications plans.
- f. Thoughts

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f. Thoughts on command structure for D Day and following, i.e., CALLIGERIS, LINCOLN, Headquarters.

g. Any plans obtained from []

h. An estimate of when activities will have reached the point of no return.

[]
C. Tracy Barnes

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